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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
October 10, 1986 Conference 
List 1, sheet 1 
No. 86-133 
NOLLAN, et ux. (desire just 
compensation) 
from Cal. Ct. App. 
Stone, Gilbert) 
v. 
CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMN. State/Civ. Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Appants challenge Cal. Ct. App.'s failure to 
evaluate whether just compensation was owing to petrs under the ---·-
Fifth Amendment after determining that the Cal. Coastal Commn. 
properly attached to a construction permit a condition requiring 
public access across appants' beach property. 
~------------------------------2. FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW: Appants own a property on 
the beach in Ventura Co., Cal. On Mar. 1, 1982, they applied for 
a coastal development permit to demolish a substandard beach 
house located on their lot. Appants proposed to replace the 
beach house with a larger residence. On Apr. 7, 1982, the Cal. 
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Coastal Commn. approved appants' permit with a condition 
requiring lateral public access across their property. Appants 
later filed in a Cal. trial court a petn for a writ of mandate. 
The court, on Jan. 18, 1983, ordered that a writ of mandate issue 
remanding the case to the Commission for a full evidentiary 
hearing. Upon remand, the Commission again approved the 
application permit with the condition requiring lateral public 
access. The trial court then issued a peremptory writ of mandate 
commanding the Commission to issue the permit without the 
condition. The Commission appealed to the Cal. Ct. App. 
The CA of Cal. reversed. The CA first noted that the trial 
court found that the evidence did not support a finding that 
appants' project would create a "direct or cumulative burden on 
public access to the sea." Because a direct burden on public 
access nee~ot be demonstrated, the trial court's ruling was in 
error. In Grupe v. California Coastal Commission, 166 Cal.App.3d 
landowner owned one of six remaining undeveloped beach fronts in 
a group of 29 adjacent lots. The 29 lots were located between 
two beaches open to public use. Grupe applied for a permit to 
build a large single family residence and the Commission approved 
the permits subject to a requirement that Grupe offer to dedicate 
a public access easement providing access to the beach. The 
court in Grupe held that the access condition was related to a 
need for public access to which Grupe's project contributed, even 
though, standing alone, it had not created the need for access. 
The Grupe court also held that the exaction did not constitute a 
I 
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it did not deprive him of a reasonable use of 
'---
The CA in the present case dismissed 
appants'contention that they need not provide public access over 
their property because there is adequate public access nearby. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Appants contend that they are entitled 
under the Fiftn Amendment to just compensation for the Cal. 
Coastal Commn's condition attached to their permit. The condition 
exacts a dedication of access across their property for public 
use. This case is different from the regulatory takings cases 
such as Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 u.s. 255 (1980). This 
Court has not directly addressed to what extent, and under what 
circumstances, an owner may be required by the State to give away 
real property without compensation as a condition of receiving 
approval to make some use of his land. Several precedents of 
this Court indicate, however, that it is the loss to the owner 
that determines whether a "taking" has occurred. United States 
v. Causby, 328 u.s. 256, 261 (1945). Moreover, several decisions 
of this Court have stated that the purpose of the Just 
Compensation Clause is to ensure that some individuals alone are 
not forced to bear fully the cost of public benefits that, in all 
fairness, should be borne by the public as a whole. See, e.g. , 
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 u.s. 104, 123 
(1978). Yet the Cal. CA has refused to consider appants' claim 
that they are being forced to bear an unfair share of the cost of 
a public benefit. The Cal. courts, however, have taken a view 
contrary to these general principles. In Georgia-Pacific Corp. 
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v. California Coastal Commission, 132 Cal.App.3d 678 (1982), the 
court stated that "a regulatory body may constitutionally require 
a dedication of property in the interest of the general welfare 
as a condition of permitting land development. It does not act 
in eminent domain when it does this, and the validity of th e 
dedication requirement is not dependent on a factual showing that 
the development has created the need for it." 
In the present case, the court determined that the exaction 
was valid because it was authorized by a statute that is a valid 
exercise of the State's police power. In several cases, this 
Court has stated that the evaluation of the constitutionality of 
the governmental act does not cease with a determination that the 
Act was a valid exercise of the police power. See, e.g., United 
States v. Security Industrial Bank, 459 u.s. 70 (1982). The Cal. 
Coastal Act was admittedly enacted to benefit the public welfare. 
Nevertheless, it is a separate question whether the statute's 
application to appants would require the payment of compensation. 
Appants are clearly entitled to compensation in this case. The 
exaction of real property from appants is not regulation. 
;fo 
Appants~are being required to give up to the govt a recognized 
property interest and to suffer a physical invasion of their 
residential property. The public has preempted appants' right to 
private enjoyment of the property they purchased. This Court has 
held that "the right to exclude others is generally one of the 
most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly 
characterized as propety." Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 
u.s. 164 (1979). Moreover, appants replacement of a single house, 
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entirely on private property, has not created the public need for 
additional state owned beach. No findings that such an effect 
occurred were made by either the Commission or the courts below. 
Appee argues that appants attack principles of 
constitutional law uniformly applied in California with which 
this Court has concurred either by express holdings or through 
dismissals of prior appeals. In Associated Home Builders of the 
Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, et al., 404 u.s. 
878 (1971), this Court concurred with a Cal. Sup. Ct. decision 
upholding the constitutionality of dedication requirements as a 
condition to approval of new development. Similarly, this Court 
rejected an appeal, for lack of a substantial federal question, 
in a case challenging appellee's ability to require fees in lieu 
of actual dedications for provision of public access. Remmenga 
v. California Coastal Commission, 106 S.Ct. 241 (1985) • In that 
case, the Cal. Ct. App. had upheld imposition of fees, in lieu of 
provision of dedicated public access, against a constitutional 
challenge identical to that proffered by appellant here. The 
opinion of the Cal. Ct. App. is consistent with this Court's 
decisions analyzing whether governmental regulation amounts to a 
taking. As this Court stated in Tiburon, supra, the application 
of the general zoning law to a particular property affects a 
taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance state 
interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his land. 
Moreover, this Court has recognized that a mere diminution in the 
value of property cannot amount to a taking. Penn Central 
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 u.s. 104, 131 (1978). Next, 
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petrs argue that the questions presented in this appeal are 
narrow and factually specific. Finally, appees argue that this 
is not a proper appeal. The validity of the California Coastal 
Act was not drawn into question below. 
the permit decision of the Cal. 
Rather, appnts challenge 
Coastal Commn. The 
constitutionality of various provisions of the Cal. Coastal Act 
was not the basis for the decision of the state appellate court. 
4. DISCUSS ION: Contrary to appees' assertion, this 
appears to be a proper appeal. The reference to a "statute of 
any state" in 28 u.s.c. §1257(2) has been defined to encompass 
orders of state commisioners and governing bodies issued in the 
exercise of their delegated legislative authority. If the 
particular order in question has the force of law, the order may 
be deemed a statute for the purposes of §1257(2). See Lathrop v. 
Donohue, 367 u.s. 820, 824-825 (1981) (opinion of JUSTICE 
BRENNAN) . Appees do not contend that the decision of the Cal. 
Coastal Commn. does not have the force of law. 
On the merits, appants claims do not appear to merit plenary 
review. This Court has held that the application of state 
regulations, such as zoning ordinances, to a particular property 
effects a taking if the regulation does not substantially advance 
legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable 
use of his land. See Tiburon, supra. The Cal CA's determination 
that the permit condition does not constitute a taking is in 
accord with this test. The Cal. Coastal Act and the particular 
permit condition at 








tidelands. See Grupe, supra. In addition, appants may still build 
their improved dwelling and therefore are not denied economically 
viable use of their land. 
I recommend DFWSFQ. 
There is a response. 
September 23, 1986 Little opn in petn 
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ral 10/16/86 
To: Justice Powell 
From: Bob 
No. 86-133, Nollan et ux. v. California Coastal Commission 
Although this is a closer question than I originally 
-issue is whether the ....____ thought, I still recommend DFWSFQ. The State takes property by refusing to grant a construction permit 
unless the property owner grants a public easement. There is no 
doubt that the property would be more valuable if the owner were 
permitted to build without granting an easement. The Court, how-
ever, has dismissed appeals challenging California's practice of 
requiring developers to "dedicate" property as a condition for 
approving new real estate developments,v;;sociated Home Builders 
v. City of Walnut Creek, et al., 404 U.S. 878 (1971), and its 
practice of requiring cash payments in lieu of dedication of real 
property, Remmenga v. Californai Coastal Commission, 106 s. Ct. 
241 (1985). This governmental regulation does not deprive the 
owner of an economically viable use of his land, and it substan-
tially advances California's interest in providing public access 
to beaches. These are the conditions set out in your opinion for 
the Court in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
There is no physical occupation of the property. (Tiburon was a 
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challenge to a zoning ordinance, however, not a challenge to a 
"condition" on a government permit) . 
You may wish to vote to NOTE if you think it is time to 
reconsider the application of the Court's more general pronounce-
ments to requirements that property owners give up valuable 
rights in return for construction permits or other valuable "lar-
gesse" from the State. These conditions can have the effect of 
assigning a large share of the cost of a public benefit to rela-
tively few property owners. In this case, the property-owner's 
right to exclude others, a "fundamental attribute of ownership," 
has been limited. See Tiburon, 447 u.s., at 262. 
o' ~ l e \ L e-t +-~ 




~ a;,_r. ~,~caL ~·~~ 
. ..... ~~ _.,._ 
~· ~ ~~~ ·· r-~ <*-.c. 1 
c.~. :S'...u..~  ~~ 
L , .... _.t- "" ~ C!::i:f.-i..u. v-+-~~ 6-;v-
~~ ~ ~~A.A.·td.AJ-J. ~ 
,t~4o(Ar, ~ ~~ ~ CH ~~~ ...... ,~., 
a....c.,.«.- ~ f- ~/rtc.e .. ~ 
BENCH MEMORANDUM 
To: Justice Powell February 24, 1987 
From: Leslie 
3, Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n 
Monday, March 30, 1987 (second argument) 
I. Summary 
The question presented in this case is whether a 
building permit condition that requires public access to 
-----walk laterally (parallel to the water) across the beach con-
stitutes a taking requiring just compensation under the 
Fifth Amendment. 
II. Background 
On March 1, 1982, appellants filed an application 
with appellee, the California Coastal Commission, for a 
• r -
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coastal development permit to demolish an existing 521 
square foot, one story, one bedroom summer residence on a 
beach front lot and to construct in its place a 1,674 square 
foot, two-story, ~ree bedroom permanent r~sidence with an 
attached ~o car garage. At the time, appellants were les-
sees of the property and possessed an option to purchase 
that was conditioned on either rehabilitating the existing 
house or replacing it with a new structure. A concrete sea-
wall, approximately 8 feet tall and 10 feet from the current 
mean hide tide 1 ine, separates the beach portion of the 
property from the house and its immediate surrounding area. 
The lot is one of 138 similar residential lots along a tract 
of beach. 
On April 7, 1982, the Executive Director of the 
Coastal Commission issued his determination that appellants 
should be granted a development permit with the condition 
that appellants first record "a deed restriction acknowledg-
ing the right of the public to pass and repass across the 
property in an area bounded by the mean high tide 1 ine --at one end to the toe of the revetment at the other end." 
The determination by the Director that access was required 
was based on findings that the proposed developnent would 
burden the public's ability to gain access along the shore-
1 ine by "discouraging the public from visiting the shore-
1 ine," "congesting existing access roads and recreational 
areas," and "increasing the use of the beach by residents 
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and guests," and because adequate access · did not already 
exist nearby. 
The Director made this determination pursuant to the 
§iiorn~_:oas_: al Act of_!!!!] which states that "public 
access" along the coast must be a condition of permitting 
"new development" along the coastal zone, unless one of sev-
eral circumstances is present, including "adequate access 
existing nearby." "Pass and re ass" access is the least 
onerous of the public access conditions exacted by the Com-
mission in granting development permits under the Coastal 
Act. Other possible conditions are "passive recreational 
use" and "active recreational use." The Commission's guide-
1 ines provide "that because the 'pass and repass' condition 
severely limits the public's access dedication should be 
used only where necessary to protect the habitat values of 
the site, where topographic constraints warrant the restric-
tion, or where it is necessary to protect the privacy of the 
landowner. n 
Appellants objected to the Director's determination 
and requested a full public hearing. The Commission denied 
----------------'----the request. Appellants filed a petition for a writ of ad-
ministrative mandamus in state superior court. The court 
granted the writ and ordered the Commission to hold a full 
public hearing on appellants' permit application. The court 
concluded that the Commission could not impose the lateral 
access condition in the absence of a showing that appel-
1 ants' proposed residential development would have an indi-
page 4. 
vidual or cumulative adverse impact on public access to the 
sea. The court discounted the relevance to the case of the 
Commission's evidence respecting the cumulative impact of 
residential construction on vacant lots and found that the 
current record did not support the Commission's decision. 
On remand, the Commission made further factual find-
ings and reinstated its prior determination, noting that it 
----------~-------------------
had similarly conditioned 43 out of 6 0 coastal development 
permits along the same tract and that the condition was con-
sistent with the public's historical use of the property. 
It found that the proposed structure constituted a "new de-
velopment" under the Act, that it would contribute to a 
"wall" of structures and would prohibit the public "psycho-
logically" "from realizing a stretch of coastline exists 
nearby that they have every right to visit." The Commission 
also found that there was no adequate alternate access near-
by. 
Appellants filed a supplemental petition for a writ 13 w:l-
of administrative mandamus with the state superior court, 4-~ 
~
which again ruled in their favor. The court found that the  
general materials relied upon by the Commission were either rt..A._ 
~~f 
not specific to appellants' property or was too speculative, 
and thus rejected the Commission's finding that the develop-~ 
ment would burden public access. The court also found that 
a test for a "new structure" base? on a 10% increase in s_}:._:_/;-
. ~ """' ,__., 
was unduly harsh as applied in this case. Finally, ~~found 
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the Commission's determination that there was inadequate 
access nearby erroneous. 
The Commission appealed the court's decision. While 
the appeal was pending, appellants exercised their option to 
purchase the property and built the proposed residence. Ap-
pellants did not notify the Commission that they were taking 
this action. The CA reversed the TC' s determination. The (4 
CA reviewed the Commission's determination under the "sub-
stantial evidence" standard. The CA found that the TC erred 
in requiring the Commission to find a "direct or cumulative 
burden on access to the sea." TheCA reasoned as follows: 
In Grupe v. California Coastal Cornrn'n, 166 Cal. App. 
3d 148, 165 (1985), the court construed the leading Califor-
nia case on the constitutionality of exactions, Assocated 
Horne Builders, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633 
(1971), to hold that only an indirect relationship between 
an exaction and a need to which the project contributes need 
exist. In Grupe, the 1 andowner owned one of 6 remaining 
undeveloped beach front lots in a group of 29 adjacent lots 
in Santa Cruz County. The 29 lots were located between two 
beaches open to public use. Grupe applied for a permit to 
build a large single family residence to be located behind a 
cement wall on his lot. The Commission approved the permit 
subject to a requirement that Grupe dedicate a public access 
easement between the mean high tide mark and the cement 
wall. The court found that the access condition was related 
to a need for public access to which Grupe's project con-
page 6. 
tributed, even though standing alone it had not created the 
need for access. The court reasoned that the project was 
one more brick in the wall separating the people of Califor-
nia from the state's tidelands. The court also bel d that 
the exaction did not constitute a taking because although it 
caused a diminution of value, it did not deprive Grupe of 
the reasonable use of his property. 
As we pointed out in Remmenga v. California Coastal 
Comm'n, 163 Cal. App. 3d 623, 628, app. dismissed, 106 s. 
Ct. 241 (1985), the justification for required dedication is 
not limited to the needs of or burdens created by the 
project. Here, appellants' project has not created the need 
for access to the tidelands fronting their property but it 
is a small project among many others which together 1 imi t 
public access to the tidelands and beaches of the state and 
therefore collectively create a need for public access. 
Grupe and Remmenga are dispositive of this case. 
Appellants' structure is a "new development" within 
the meaning of the statute. There is not adequate alterna-
tive access. The Commission's order is affirmed. 
III. Analysis 
To determine whether particular governmental actions 
result in takings, the Court engages in "ad hoc, factual 
inquiries into the circumstances of each particular case." 
Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guarantee Corp., 106 s. Ct. 1018 
(1986). The Court has identified three factors necess~ao 
z. · 
this inquiry :@ the economic impact of the regulation, he 
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extent to which it interferes with investment-backed expec-
tations, and th~haracter of the governmental action." 
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 u.s. 
104, 124 (1978) 0 
A. Character of the Governmental Action 
,, \1 
This Court has held that "a permanent physical occu-
pation is a government action of such a unique character ----, 
that it is a taking without regard to other factors that a ..._.., 
court might ordinarily examine." Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV Corp. , 4 5 8 u. s. 419 , 4 3 2 ( 19 8 2 ) • See also 
FCC v. Florida Power Co. (Pole Attachments), u.s. 
(1987). The intrusion in this case can properly be termed 
"physical," thus the rule that a taking "may more readily be ~ .,:.._ 
·~ ""\\ A. -IY~ 
found when the interference with ~roperty can be character-
ized as a physical invasion by the government" applies. 
Penn Central, 438 u.s., at 124. But the invasion is not 
properly charact anent," thus the ~ se rule 
of Loretto does not apply. Moreover, the restriction is 
1 . 'J. imposed pursuant to appellants' voluntary action, thus it 
does not require a physical occupation. For this reason 
also, the per se rule of Loretto does not apply. See Pole 
Attachments, slip. op. at 5-6. In Loretto, the Court quoted 
a previous case, Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 u.s. 
164, 180 (1979), noting that although "[an] easement of pas-
sage, not being a permanent occupation of land, was not con-
side red a taking per se, Kaiser Aetna reemphasizes that a 
page 8. 
physical invasion is a government intrusion of an unusually 
serious character." Loretto, 458 u.s., at 433. 
Here, the state has imposed a "pass and repass" 
easement upon appellants. On the one hand, the government 
bears a strong burden of justification because of the physi-
cal nature of the burden imposed. This Court has recognized 
that the right to exclude others from one's property is "one 
of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that 
are commonly characterized as property." Kaiser Aetna, 444 
u.s., at 176. The CA did not properly acknowledge the 
weight of the state's burden. Instead, the court treated 
the action in this case just like any other type of zoning 
regulation. On the other hand, however, even physical inva-
sions can be justified by a strong state interest, depending 
upon the balance of the other factors. See, e.g., Pole At-
tachments. The lower court identified a strong state inter-
est in preserving access to public waters. Moreover, the 
court found that appellants' building project contributed to 
the need to preserve access. Thus, the burden on appel-
lants' property was found to be related to a strong public 
purpose. The question then is whether the burden imposed in 
this case is "so substantial" that "'justice and fairness' 
require that [it] be borne by the public as a whole." Kirby 
Forest Industries, Inc. v. United States, 467 u.s. 1, 14 
(1984). 
The Court could find that the physical invasion in 
this case is simply too burdensome. But the scope of the 
page 9. 
t-vr 
physical invasion in this case is more limited than it may 
"' --""" 
se~. What is really at issue is l en feet ~r less 3 a 1-~ 
of beach between the high water mark and the sea wall. The ~ . 
..... - I ........... 
public onl has an easement to "pass and repass," which 
means to walk by appellant's beach. The state owns the 
property underneath the ocean up to the high water mark. 
Because of the tides, the water is only up to the high water 
mark once a day. When the water is not up to the high water 
mark, the public can walk along the dry beach and still be 
walking on public property. Appellants have no legal right 
to exclude the public from doing this. Moreover, even when 
the water is high, the public could legally walk in ankle 
deep water without physically invading appellants' property. 
All of these facts lessen the impact of the actual physical 
invasion of appellants' property. The easement slightly 
broadens the physical area in which the public may walk, 
but does not create the fact that appellants must put up 
with public passage very close to their property. 
The state acted pursuant to its police power and the 5 ~~ 
~  
state interest at issue is substantial. The state is trying ~ 
. ~J.~'-M..!. to preserve the use of a valuable and limited publ1c re-
source for the use of all citizens. The court found that 
appellants' project was "one more brick in the wall separat-
ing the people of California from the state's tidelands." 
The state found that as a condition for contributing to the 
separation, appellants had to compensate in another way to 
preserve the status quo. Balancing the nature of the intru-
page 10. 
sion on the landowner against the nature of the state ac-
tion, it does not appear that the character of the state 
action alone should lead to a finding of a taking. 
B. Reasonable Inv,estment-backed Expectations 
"The timing of acquisition of [property] is relevant 
to a takings analysis of [the owner's] investment-backed 
expectation." Andrus v. Allard, 444 u.s. 51, 64-65 (1979). 
Notice of extensive government regulation weighs against a 
finding of a taking. Connolly, supra. A strong argument 
can be made in this case that appellants did not have a rea-
sonable investment-backed expectation in the ten foot strip 
of property at issue. 
First, appellants have always been on notice that 
the public has a right of access to the publicly-owned wa-
ters. In fact, this right is guaranteed by the ~~con-- -
stitution, Art. X, §4 ("No individual, partnership, or cor-------
poration, claiming or possessing the frontage or tidal lands 
of a harbor, bay, inlet, estuary, or other navigable water 
in this State, shall be permitted to exclude the right of 
way to such water whenever it is required for any public 
purpose, nor to destroy or obstruct the free navigation of 
such water; and the Legislature shall enact such 1 aws as 
will give the most 1 iberal construction to this provision, 
so that access to the navigable waters of this State shall 
be always attainable for the people thereof."). Moreover, 









have always been on notice that at any time other than high 
tide, the public is free to walk by their beach. 
B appellants in this case did not purchase ~ 
their property unti-!._~Commission' s_ decision that ~ ~ 
~~ the easement must be granted as a condition of access. 
Third, the evidence below was that the public had been using 
the right-of-way without a formal notation in the deed, so 
appellants may well have lost the right to object and in any 
case cannot claim an expectation that they would be able to 
exclude the public from the walkway. Fourth, all other 
landowners in appellants' tract have been required to give 
similar easements, thus sharing the burden among all those 
contributing to the burden on public access. 
The other side of the argument is that mere notice 
of a condition does not insulate it from takings scrutiny if ------
the regulation "so frustrates property rights that compensa-
tion must be paid." Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 u.s. 255, ~ 
260 (1980). Thus, the mere fact that appellants had notice 
of the burden and that the restriction is rationally related 
to a substantial state interest does not insulate it from 
constitutional challenge if, on balance, it appears unrea-
sonable. Viewing the investment-backed expectations as one 
factor, then, the above considerations weigh in favor of the 
constitutional validity of the restriction. 
C. Economically Viable Use of the Land 
In Agins, the Court stated that an application of a 
state's police power effects a taking only if it "denies an 
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owner economically viable use of his land." 447 u.s., at 
'- _---...,J 
260. The deed restriction preserves numerous economically 
viable uses of appellants' land, both the entire parcel, 
whose value was probably increased by the ability to build 
the larger house, and the ten feet of beach at issue, since 
appellants can still conduct any activities that also permit 
public access. Instead of ending the inquiry at this point, 
however, it appears better to balance all factors. Agins 
was decided in the context of a typical zoning "use" re-
strict ion. This case involves a physical invasion that } 
calls for greater scrutiny. 
D. Synthesis 
The~uggests a two-part test for determining the 
constitutionality of a restriction such as that at issue in 
this case. ~the permit ~ondi tion must advance the 
same legitimate governmental purpose furthered by the re-
striction the permit excuses. ~ the condition must be 
reasonably designed both in character and degree to address 
those burdens that the developnent of the property would 
impose on the public. These considerations appear appropri-
ately to focus the inquiry on "whether the restriction on 
private property 'force[es] some people alone to bear public 
.. ·· 
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne 
by the public as a whole. '" Prune Yard Shopping Center v. 
Robins, 447 u.s. 74, 83 (1980) (quoting Armstrong v. United 
States, 364 u.s. 40, 49 (1960)). 
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The Court could strike the balance, given the facts 
in the record. There are two strong arguments that support 
--------------------------
fin~ng a t~ing. First, the character of the governmental 
action. This Court has indicated that it is very hard to 
justify a physical intrusion, especially on property used 
for a private dwelling. Second, the CA specifically found 
that the deed restriction need not be justified by a direct 
burden caused by appellants' building. It found that an 
indirect burden caused by all other developuents in the 
tract and projected future develo{Xnent on access needs was 
sufficient to support imposing the building condition. The 
Court could find that where a physical invasion is at issue, 
a direct relationship between the burden caused and the con-
dition is required. 
" The better view appears to be that even the physical 
access condition' at issue in this case can be justified by a -
sufficiently important gov ernrnental purpose. The condition 
\ 
is not unilaterally imposed (as it was for example in Penn 
Central), but comes into play only when property owners seek 
to improve their homes. Although this consideration is not 
dispositive, it lessens the impact of the condition by giv-
ing the landowners a choice. Also, the direct/indirect bur--
den distinction of the CA appears to make sense. By taking 
into account all the present and projected developments, the 
Commission can best spread the burden of access conditions 
among all landowners. If a direct burden were required to 
impose an access condition, it would create the anomalous 
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situation where the first nine homeowners to build in a 
tract would not be required to grant access, because access 
on lot 10 was still available. Then, when the owner of lot 
10 sought to build, there would be no other available ac-
cess, and an access condition on his property would be jus-
tif ied. In the context of booming devel opnent and a sea rce 
1..._. '---
resource like access to the ocean, the CA' s "brick in the 
wall" concept appears to make sense. 
Whichever result appears more appropriate, however, 
the que~n is wheth~r the se~ord is developed enough for -
this Court to strike the balance, or whether a remand to ---the lower court is appropriate. TheCA relied on its previ-... .._ ____ \ IA_..c.~ L "' 
ous decision in Grupe, so a brief analysis of that case is ...,r~ 
required. 
In Grupe, the CA noted that it had previously held 
that, as a general proposition, the Commission may constitu-
tionally require uncompensated access dedication as a condi-
tion of approving coastal developnent. Resp in that case 
was subject to to a greater condition of access than petrs 
in this case: Grupe was required to dedicate the area be-
tween his seawall and the ocean for "pass and repass" as 
well as passive r ecr ea tional use. Resp did not challenge 
the Commission's general authority, but instead sought to 
distinguish the facts of his case on the basis that he was 
not a developer but rather a single homeowner. The CA first 
found that the restriction did not deprive resp of all rea-
sonable use or the economic value of his property, and thus 
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met the requirement of Agins. Second, the CA found the fact 
that the intrusion was "physical" was not dispositive, cit-
ing cases in which this Court denied cert when developers 
had been required to dedicate open spaces as parks in order 
to obtain development permits. Finally, the CA found that 
the restriction did not act as "an acquisition of resources 
to permit or facilitate uniquely public functions," Penn 
Central, 438 u.s., at 128, because the benefits of the per-
mit arrangement is reciprocal. 
The CA in Grupe thus underwent a substantially more l{ 
detailed taking analysis than it did in this case. Since 
the issues raised in the two cases are so similar, the Grupe 
reasoning can be deemed to be incorporated in this decision. 
Even Grupe, however, appears to put too much emphasis on the 
remaining economic value of the property, and too 1 ittle 
analysis on the character of the intrusion and the closeness 
of the fit between the governmental objective and the burden 
created by the landowners' development. As indicated above, 
it seems that the burden imposed in this case can be justi-
fied, but the analysis should carefully and specifically 
weigh the relative burdens. Also because the application of 
a state statute is at issue, it appears prudent to remand 
the case for resolution under the proper standard. The 
statute will continue to be applied, and it is important 
that the CA undergo the correct analysis in the future. 
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IV. Conclusion 
There are three factors to consider when determining 
whether a government restriction constitutes a taking QJ the 
character of the governmental action~he impact on reason-
able investment-backed expectations, and t~conomic impact 
~ 
of the regulation. None of these considerations ~ dispos-
itive in this case. ~ the invasion is physical, so it 
must be justified by ~substantial governmental interest. ~,L .? 
At the same time, it i~' not a permanent invasion,~
is no ~ se taking, and the government interest in protect-
ing access to the sea appears strong. ~ there appears 
to be little interference with investment-backed expecta-
tions, since petrs were on notice that land use in Califor-
~
nia is heavily regulated and that the public has as consti-
tutional ri~ access to the ocean. eY t-;;;---;conomic 
impact does not appear severe. Although the access require-
ment may diminish the land's value, the improved structure 
increases it. 
The SG suggests that a proper test is whether the 
restriction furthers the important governmental interest and 
whether the degree of the burden is reasonably related to 
the harm caused by petrs' development. It appears tha t_ the 
restriction at issue could pass muster under this test. The 
better procedure, however, would be to remand so the TC and 
CA can undergo the proper analysis in applying the statute 
to the facts of this case. Although the result appears de-
fensible, the CA did not properly consider the degree of 
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burden of the physical invasion and did not specifically 
find that the restriction imposed is proportional to the 
degree of harm caused by petrs' development. Unless the 
Court finds that the nature of the restriction is too severe 
no matter what the state interest, the proper result appears 
to be to VACATE AND REMAND. 
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From: Justice Scalia 
Circulated: --=---1------'lc..:::.9-=,S-=--7-
Recirculated: ________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 86- 133 
JAMES PATRICK NOLLAN, ET ux., APPELLANT v. 
CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION 
~ 4 I 'f) ~ ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, W"YJ. ~ 
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 
tvz_,v/._ -k~'s- [June-, 1987] AAJ ~~ 
~J. A-. 1.__ · JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court. ~ 
'l"'r,_.- James and Marilyn Nollan appeal from a decision of the ~ 
_ 11 _ .. _ k.. California Court of Appeal ruling that the California Coastal  ~ 
~~.,-Co~sion could co-nditio. nits ~t of permission to rebuild _ L. 
( 
/ / I n th~USe On their~nsfer to the public Of an easement l-/{ , 
across their beachfront property. Nollan v-:-california 
~) Coastaic:ommisswn, 177 Cal. App. 3d 719, 223 Cal. Rptr. .5,_J_, ~.-£/!- JLo 
I 28, (1986). The California Court rejected their claim that ~ ---Q- ' 
imposition ofthat condition violates the Takings Clause ofthe L._ -~
Fifth Amendment, as incorporated against the States by the (J --v 
Fourteenth Amendment. Ibid. We noted probable juris-
diction. - U. S. - (1986). Q I 
. I /.<::e.~ 
The Nollans own a beachfront lot in Ventura County, Cali-~ 4 
fornia. A quarter-mile north of their property is Faria YkL ~ 
County Park, an oceanside public park with a public beach tf' r • 
and recreation area. Another public beach area, known lo-
cally as "the Cove," lies 1,800 feet south of their lot. A con- jJ c, 7 _ 7 
crete seawall approximately eight feet high separates the l 
beach portion of the N ollans' property from the rest of the ~ ~. 
lot. The historic mean high tide line determines the lot's 
oceanside boundary. ~ r 
The N ollans originally leased their property with an option ~,I..,~~ 
to buy. The building on the lot was a small bungalow, total- • - · - -- 1) v 
- ~~fl~Z 
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ing 504 square feet, which for a time they rented to summer 
vacationers. After years of rental use, however, the build-
ing had fallen into disrepair, and could no longer be rented 
out. 
The N ollans' option to purchase was conditioned on their 
promise to demolish the bungalow and replace it. In order 
to do so, under California Public Resources Code §§ 30106, 
30212, and 30600 (West 1986), they were required to obtain a 
coastal development permit from the California Coastal Com-
mission. On February 25, 1982, they submitted a permit 
application to the Commission in which they proposed to de-
molish the existing structure and replace it with a three-bed-
room house in keeping with the rest of the neighborhood. 
The N ollans were informed that their application had been 
placed on the administrative calendar, and that the Commis-
sion staff had recommended that the permit be granted sub-
ject to the condition that they allow the public an easement to 
pass across a portion of their property bounded by the mean 
high tide line on one side, and their seawall on the other side. 
This would make it easier for the public to get to Faria 
County Park and the Cove. The N ollans protested imposi-
tion of the condition, but the Commission overruled their ob-
jections and gr~nted the permitJ:SuEJeffito their recordation 
of a deed restriction granting tlje easement. App. 31, 34. 
On June 3, 1982, the Nollans filed a petition for writ of ad-
ministrative mandamus asking the Ventura County Superior 
Court to invalidate the access condition. They argued that 
the condition could not be imposed absent .evidence that their 
proposed development would have a direct adverse impact on 
public access to the beach. The court agreed, and remanded 
the case to the Commission for a full evidentiary hearing on 
that issue. App. 36. 
On remand, the Commission held a public hearing, after 
which it made further factual findings and reaffirmed its im-
position of the condition. It found that the new house would 
increase blockage of the view of the ocean, thus contributing 
86-133-0PINION 
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to the development of "a 'wall' of residential structures" that 
would prevent the public "psychologically" "from realizing a 
stretch of coastline exists nearby that they have every right 
to visit." App. 58. The new house would also increase pri-
vate use of the shorefront. I d., at 59. These effects of con-
struction of the house, along with other area development, 
would cumulatively "burden the public's ability to traverse to 
and along the shorefront." I d., at 65-66. Therefore the 
Commission could properly require the N ollans to offset that 
burden by providing additional lateral access to the public 
beaches in the form of an easement across their property. 
l The Commission also noted that it had similarly conditioned 43 out of 60 coastal development permits along the same tract of land, and that of the 17 not so conditioned, 14 had been ap-provecl when the Commission did not have administrative 
regulations in place allowing imposition of the condition, and 
the remaining 3 had not involved shorefront property. /d., 
at 47-48. 
The N ollans filed a supplemental petition for a writ of ad-
ministrative mandamus with the Superior Court, in which 
they argued that imposition of the access condition violated 
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as incorporated 
against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Su-
perior Court ruled in their favor on statutory ground'8,lrria-
ing, m }mft to avoid "issues of constitutionality," that the 
California Coastal Act, Cal. Pub. Res. Code Ann. §§ 30000 
et seq., authorized the Commission to impose public access 
conditions on coastal development permits for the replace-
ment of an existing single-family home with a new one only 
where the ,ero:Qosed development would have an adverse im-
pact on publicaccess to the sea. App. 419. In the Court's 
----;-;--- .-~
view, the administrative record did not provide an adequate 
factual basis for concluding that replacement of the bungalow 
with the house would create a direct or cumulative burden on 
public access to the sea. I d., at 416-417. Accordingly, the 
5/cl-
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Superior Court granted the writ of mandamus and directed 
that the permit condition be struck. 
The Commission appealed to the California Court of Ap-
peal. While that appeal was pending, the Nollans satisfied 
the condition on their option to purchase by tearing down the 
bungalow and building the new house, and bought the prop-
erty. They did not notify the Commission that they were 
taking that action. 
The Court of Appeal reversed the Superior Court. 
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, supra, 177 Cal. 
App. 3d 719, 223 Cal. Rptr. 28. It disagreed with the Supe-
rior Court's interpretation of the Coastal Act, finding that it 
required that a coastal permit for the construction of a new 
house whose floor area, height or bulk was more than 10% 
larger than that of the house it was replacing be conditioned 
on a gran .o access. a . pp. d, a 723-724, 223 Cal. 
Rptr., at 31; see Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 30212. It also ruled 
that that requirement did not violate the Constitution under 
the reasoning of an earlier case of the Court of Appeal, Grupe 
v. California Coastal Commission, 166 Cal. App. 3d 148, 212 
Cal. Rptr. 578 (1985). In that case, the court had found that 
so long as a project contributed to the need for public access, 
even if the project standing alone had not created the need 
for access, and even if there was only an indirect relationship 
between the access exacted and the need to which the project 
contributed, imposition of an access condition on a develop-
ment permit was sufficiently related to burdens created by 
the project to be constitutional. N allan, supra, 177 Cal. 
App. 3d, at 723, 223 Cal. Rptr., at 30-31; see Grupe, supra, 
166 Cal. App., at 165-168, 212 Cal. Rptr., at--; see also 
Remmenga v. California Coastal Commission, 163 Cal. 
App. 3d 623, 628, 209 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1985). The Court of 
Appeal ruled that the record established that that was the 
situation with respect to the N ollans' house. N allan, supra, 
177 Cal. App. 3d, at 722-723, 223 Cal. Rptr., at 30-31. It 
ruled that the N ollans' taking claim also failed because, al-
86-133-0PINION 
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though the condition diminished the value of the N ollans' lot, 
it did not deprive them of all reasonable use of their property. 
Nollan, supra, 177 Cal. App. 3d, at 723, 223 Cal. Rptr., at 
30; see Grupe, supra, 166 Cal. App. 3d, at 175-176, 209 Cal. 
Rptr., at--. Since, in the Court of Appeal's view, there 
was no statutory or constitutional obstacle to imposition of 
the access condition, the Superior Court erred in granting 
the writ of mandamus. N ollan, supra. The N ollans ap-
pealed to this Court, raising only the constitutional question. 
II 
Had California simply required the N ollans to make an 
easement across their beachfront available to the public on a 
permanent basis in order to increase public access to the 
beach, rather than conditioning their permit to rebuild their 
house on their agreeing to do so, we have no doubt there 
would have been a taking. To say that the appropriation of a 
public easement across a landowner's premises does not con-
stitute the taking of a property interest would be to use 
words in a manner that deprives them of all their ordinary 
meaning. Indeed, one of the principal uses of the eminent 
domain power is to assure that the government be able to re-
quire conveyance of just such interests, so long as it pays for 
them. J. Sackman, Nichols on Eminent Domain §§ 2.1[1], 
5.01[5] (Rev. 3d ed. 1985); see id., at §§ 1.42[9], 6.14. Per-
haps because the point is so obvious, we have never been con-
fronted with a controversy that required us to rule upon it, 
but our cases' analysis of the effect of other governmental 
action leads to the same conclusion. We have repeatedly 
held that, as to property reserved ·by its owner for private 
use, "the right to exclude [others is] 'one of the most essential 
sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly character-
ized as property."' vLoretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan 
CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419, 433 (1982), quoting Kaiser 
Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S. 164, 176 (1979). In 
Loretto we observed that where governmental action results 
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in "a permanent physical occupation of the property," by the 
government itself or by others, see 458 U. S., at 432 n. 9, 
"our cases uniformly have found a taking to the extent of the 
occupation, without regard to whether the action achieves an 
important public benefit or has only minimal economic impact 
on the owner," 458 U. S., at 434-435. We think a "perma-
nent physical occupation" has occurred, for purposes of that 
rule, where individuals are given a permanent and continuous 
right to pass to and fro, so that the real property may 
continuously be traversed, even though no particular indi-
vidual is permitted to station himself permanently upon the 
premises. 1 
Given, then, that requiring uncompensated conveyance of 
the easement outright would violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, th}Vluestion becomes whether requiring it to be con-
veyed ~ a condition for issuing a land use permit alters the 
outcome. We have long recognized that 1and use regulatiort' 
fo~s (sh~f regulation so restrictive that it 
would deRr · ve the owner f all economically viable use of his 
l~!S law . ee gms v. 1 uron, 447 U. S. 255, 
260-262(1980) (scenic zoning)rf'"enn Central Transportation 
Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104 (1978) (landmark pres-
ervation);'1?uclid v. Ambler Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926) (resi-
dential zoning); Laitos and Westfall, Government Interfer-
ence with Private Interests in Public Resources, 11 Harv. 
Envtl. L. Rev. 1, 66 (1987). The Commission argues that 
among these permissible purposes are protecting the public's 
ability to see the beach, assisting the public in overcoming 
the "psychological barrier" to using the beach created by a 
/ 
'The holding of PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74 
(1980), is not inconsistent with this analysis, since there the owner had al-
ready opened his property to the general public, and in addition permanent 
access was not required. The analysis of Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 
supra, is not inconsistent because it was affected by traditional doctrines 
regarding navigational servitudes. Of course neither of those cases in-
volved, as this one does, a classic right-of-way easement. 
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developed shorefront, and preventing congestion on the pub-
lic beaches. We assume, without deciding, that this iss~ 
in whi~~~n uestiona..Q!y_1¥ould be able 
to deny th~eiLP&rmit QJ.ltrighl_ if their new house 
(alone;oT-by reason of the cumulative impact produced in 
conjunction with othe~ construction) 2 would impede these 
pum_q_ses, unless the denial would intrelere so drastically 
with the N ollans' use of their property as to constitute a tak-
ing. See Penn Central, supra. r 
The Commission argues that a permit condition that serves 
the same legitimate police-power purpose as a refusal to issue 
the permit should not be found to be a taking if the refusal to 
issue the permit would not constitute a taking. We agree. 
Thus, if the Commission attached to the permit some condi-
tion that would have protected the public's ability to see the 
beach notwithstanding construction of the new house-for 
example, a height limitation, a width restriction, or a ban on 
fences-so long as the Commission could have exercised its 
police power (as we have assumed it could) to forbid construc-
tion _ of the .!!_ou~ ~er, imposition of the condition 
wou~stihrtional. Moreover (and here we come 
closer to the facts of the present case), the condition would be 
constitutional even if it consisted of the requirement that the 
N ollans provide a viewing spot on their property for pass-
ersby with whose ~sighting of the ocean their new house 
would interfere. Although such a requirement, constituting 
2 If the N ollans were being singled out to bear the burden of California's 
attempt to remedy these problems, although they had not contributed to it 
more than other coastal landowners, the State's action, even if otherwise 
valid, might violate either the incorporated Takings Clause or the Equal 
Protection Clause. One of the principal purposes of the Takings Clause is 
"to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens 
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." 
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U. S. 40, 49 (1960); see also San Diego 
Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U. S. 621, 656 (1981) (BRENNAN, J., 
dissenting); Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 
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a permanent grant of continuous access to the property, 
would have to be considered a taking if it were not attached 
to a development permit, the Commission's assumed power 
to forbid construction of the house in order to protect the 
public's view of the beach must surely include the power to 
condition construction upon some concession by the owner, 
even a concession of property rights, that serves the same 
end. If a prohibition designed to accomplish that purpose 
would be a legitimate exercise of the police power rather than 
a taking, it would be strange to conclude that providing the 
owner an alternative to that prohibitton which accomplishes 
the same purpose is not. 
The ev·dent constitutional ropriet disa ears, h~ever, 
if the condition su_Q_stituted for the prohibition utterly fails to 
fu~her th~n(~d~n'Ceaas the justification for the prohi- 7 
bition. When that essential nexus is eliminated, the situa-
tion becomes the same as if California law forbade shouting 
fire in a crowded theater, but granted dispensations to those 
willing to surrender an easement on their beachfront prop-
erty. While the ban on shouting fire is a core exercise of the 
State's police power to protect the public safety, and thus 
meets even our stringent standards for regulation of speech, 
requiring that a person wishing to shout fire give up an ease-
ment in no way accomplishes that purpose. Th~ State's will-
ingness to refrain from using its olice ower in order to 
obtain an ut er unrelate e fit demonstrates that it was 
not serious about the threat to the public safety in the first "/ 
place. Therefore, even though, in a sense, requiring a land- J { 
owner to give up-an easement if he wishes to shout fire is a 
lesser restriction on speech than an outright ban, it would not 
pass constitutional muster. Similarly here, unless the per-
mit condition serves the same governmental purpose as the 
development ban, it is not an exercise of the police power, 
but "an out-and-out plan of extortion." See J. ED Asso-
ciates, Inc. v. Atkinson, 121 N. H. 581, 584, 432 A. 2d 12, 
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14-15 (1981). 3 See also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan 
CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419, 439 n. 17 (1982). 
III 
The Commission claims that it concedes as much, and that 
we may sustain the conditiQn at issue here by finding that it 
is reasonably related -to the public need or burden that the 
N ollans' new house creates or to which it contributes. We 
need not determine whether the Commission's proposed test 
as to how close a "fit" is required is the right one, compare 
Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. M aunt Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 
375, 380, 176 N. E. 2d 799, 802 (1961) (condition must be 
designed to impose on property owner only those costs 
"uniquely and specifically attributable" to project) with 
Collis v. Bloomington, 310 Minn. 5, 246 N. W. 2d 19 (1976) 
(rational relationship between burden and exaction re-
quired), because the condition that the N ollans give the pub-
He an easement across their beachfront does not satisfy even 
the most untailored notion of a fit. The Commission's princi-
pal contention to the contrary essentially turns on a play on 
the word "aceess." The N ollans' new house, the Commission 
found, will interfere with "visual access" to the beach. That 
in turn (along with oth~r shorefront development) will inter-
fere with the desire of people who drive past the N ollans' 
house to use the beach, thus creating a "psychological bar-
rier" to "access." The Nollans' new house will also, by a 
process not altogether clear from the Commission's opinion 
but presumably potent enough to more than offset the effects 
of the psychological barrier, increase the use of the public 
a One would expect that a regime in which this kind of leveraging of the 
police power is allowed would produce stringent land-use regulation which 
the State then waives to accomplish other purposes, leading to lesser real-
ization of the land-use goals purportedly sought to be served than would 
result from more lenient (but non-tradeable) development restrictions. 
Thus, the importance of the purpose underlying the prohibition not only 
does not justify the imposition of unrelated conditions for eliminating the 
prohibition, but positively militates against the practice. 
86-133-0PINION 
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beaches, thus creating the need for more "access." These 
burdens on "access" would be alleviated by a requirement 
that the N ollans provide "lateral access" to the beach. 
Rewriting the argument to eliminate the play on words 
makes clear that there is nothing to it. It is quite impossible 
to understand how a requirement that-penpteruready on the 
public beaches be able to walk ·across the N ollans' property 
reduces any obstacles to viewing the beach created by the 
new house. It is also impossible to understand how it lowers 
any "psychological barrier" to using the public beaches, or 
how it helps to remedy any additional congestion on them 
caused by construction of the Nollans' new house.. We 
therefore find that the Commission's imposition of the 2ermit 
condition cannot be treated as an exercise of its land use 
po;e;r~these purposes. Our conclusion on this 
point IS consisten w1 the approach taken by every other 
court that has considered the question, with the exception of 
the California state courts. See Parks v. Watson, 716 F. 2d 
646, 651-653 (CA9 1983); Bethlehem Evangelical Lutheran 
Church v. Lakewood, 626 P. 2d 668, 671-674 (Colo. 1981); 
Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Commission, 
160 Conn. 109, 117-120, 273 A. 2d 880, 885 (1970); Longboat 
Key v. Lands End, Ltd., 433 So. 2d 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1983); Pioneer Trust & Saving Bank v. Mount Prospect, 22 
Ill. 2d 375, 176 N. E. 2d 799 (1961); Lampton v. Pinaire, 610 
S. W. 2d 915, - (Ky. Ct. App. 1980); Schwing v. Baton 
Rouge, 249 So. 2d 304 (La. Ct. App.), application denied, 259 
La. 770, 252 So. 2d 667 (1971); Howard County v. JJM, Inc., 
301 Md. 256, 280-182, 482 A. 2d 908, - (1984); Collis v. 
Bloomington, 310 Minn. 5, 246 N. W. 2d 19 (1976); State ex 
rel. Noland v. St. Louis County, 478 S. W. 2d 363 (Mo. 
1972); Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 144 
Mont. 25, 33-36, 394 P. 2d 182, 187-188 (1964); Simpson v. 
North Platte, 206 Neb. 240, 292 N. W. 2d 297 (1980); Briar 
West, Inc. v. Lincoln, 206 Neb. 172, 291 N. W. 2d 730 (1980); 
J. ED Associates v. Atkinson, 121 N. H. 581, 432 A. 2d 12 
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(1981); Longridge Builders, Inc. v. Planning Board, 52 N. J. 
348, 350-351, 245 A. 2d 336, 337-338 (1968); Jenad, Inc. v. 
Scarsdale, 18 N. Y. 2d 78, 218 N. E. 2d 673 (1966); Mackall 
v. White, 85 App. Div. 696, 445 N. Y.S. 2d 486 (1981), appeal 
denied, 56 N. Y. 2d 503, 435 N. E. 2d 1100 (1982); Frank 
Ansuini, Inc. v. Cranston, 107 R. I. 63, 68-69, 71, 264 A. 2d 
910, 913, 914 (1970); College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 
680 S. W. 2d 802, 807 (Tex. 1984); Call v. West Jordan, 614 
P. 2d 1257, 1258-1259 (Utah 1980); Board of Supervisors v. 
Rowe, 216 Va. 128, 136-139, 216 S. E. 2d 199, 207-209 (1975); 
Jordan v. Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 617-618, 137 
N. W. 2d 442, 447-449 (1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U. S. 4 
(1966). See also Littlefield v. Akron, 785 F. 2d 596, 607 
(CA8 1986). 
We are left, then, with the Commission's non-land-use jus-
tification for the access requirement: 
-- "Fi~ally, the Commission notes that there are several 
existing provisions of pass and repass lateral access 
benefits already given by past Faria Beach Tract appli-
cants as a result of prior coastal permit decisions. The 
access required as a condition of this permit is part of a 
comprehensive program to provide continuous public ac-
cess along Faria Beach as the lots undergo development 
or redevelopment." App. 68. 
That is simply an expression of the Commission's belief that 
the public interest will be served by a continuous strip of pub-
licly accessible beach along the coast. The Commission may 
well be right that it is a good idea, but that does not establish 
that the N ollans (and other coastal residents) alone can be 
compelled to contribute to its realization. Rather, California 
is free to advance its "comprehensive program," if it wishes, 
by using its power of eminent domain for this "public pur-
pose," see U. S. Const., Amend. V; but if it wants an ease-
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MEMORANDUM 
To: Justice Powell June 3, 1987 
From: Leslie 
No. 86-133, Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n 
I have reviewed Justice Scalia's draft Court opinion 
again, as well as our file on the case. There is no question 
that the opinion is written in a manner more suiting a law review 
commentary than a Court opinion. Justice Scalia's writing style 
makes the c~iples of his opinions difficult to discern. 'r J 
After further review, however, I still believe that the draft 
generally is consistent with your views. To make sure this is 
true, I will first explain what I think your view is (garnered 
from your conference notes) and then will parse Justice Scalia's 
opinion to examine what it actually holds. 
page 2. 
Your notes indicate that you were inclined to reverse. 
~~~" 
You believe that the State could require access, but there must 
------~--~ --
be a reasonable relationship between a state regulation and its 
purpose. Here the purpose was to assure public horizonta L ac -
cess, whereas the trial court found: (1) the record does not show 
that enlarging this horne will . burden public access; and ( 2) 
neighbors on each side of petrs' horne are not required to give an 
easement unless they enlarge their residences. The first point 
indicates that there is no reasonable relationship between the 
petrs' conduct and the end that the state wants to achieve. The 
seco~d point indicates that even if there were a reasonable rela-
tionship between the petrs' conduct and the state purpose, the 
condition is suspect because it is not uniform. Your conference 
notes indicate that the Court voted to reverse on the theory that 
the permit condition lacked a reasonable relationship to the 
state's purpose. Thus, you agreed with the theory of the Court. 
Justice Scalia's draft is divided into three _parts. Pa r t 
~/"'yo,. ~ . 
I is th ryi} states that a permit condition should be 
analyzed like any other police power land use regulation. But 
even if a permit condition could be upheld as a flat-out land use 
regulation, it will be invalid if the condition is not reasonably 
related to the state purpose. ~ demonstrates that this 
permit condition is not reasonably related to the state purpose. 
This broad outline appears consistent with your point of view. 
Your problem is with Part II, and s o I will analyze that 
in more detail. You agree with the f irst paragraph, that states 
that the taking of an easement without compensation is generally 
page 3. 
unconstitutional. The next paragraph begins by stating that the 
question in this case is whether the taking of the easement can 
be justified as a permit condition when it would not be justified 
standing alone. The next sentence states that land use regula-
tion may be lawful, citing Agins v. Tiburon and Penn Central. 
Both of these cases apply the .accepted 3-pronged Penn Central 
test for a taking. So this sentence is best read to mean that 
l \ ., 
land use regulation may be lawful depending upon its character 
~
~-------------------and its economic impact. The opinion then cites the purposes 
that California alleges support the permit condition at issue. 
The next sentence is th 
without deciding, that this is so " 
"We assume, r 
"This" refers to the Com-
mission's argument that its purposes are permissible. Thus, the 
opinion assumes, without deciding, that the purposes stated by 
the Commission are permissible land regulation purposes. The 
sentence continues: "in which case the Commission unquestionably 
would be able to deny the Nollans their permit outright if their 
new house would impede these purposes, unless the denial 
would interfere 
1-( 
so drastically with the Nollans' use of their 
property as to constitute a taking. See Penn Central, supra." 
This sentence states that if the purposes alleged by the state 
are permissible land use regulation purposes, then the state 
would have the authority to deny the permit outright unless the 
result of the denial failed to meet the takings test of Penn Cen-
tral. In the abstract, this proposition is in accord with your 
---.__; 
view. To take Penn Central as an example, the state's purpose 
~ 
(historic preservation) was a legitimate land use purpose. 
page 4. 
Therefore, the state had the authority to prevent Penn Central 
entirely from building in its airspace. When analyzed under the 
3-pronged takings test, the result of the application of the reg-
ulation was not so drastic as to constitute a taking. In this 
specific case, the sentence states only that assuming the Commis-
<>-
s ion's purposes to be valid, it .could prohibit the Nollans' con-
struction outright, so long as the prohibition did not so drasti-
cally affect the Nollans' property rights that it resulted in a 
taking. Theoretically, you would agree with this sentence. It 
is also true, however, that no matter what the justifications 
advanced by the state, you would almost certainly find that out-
right denial of a permit would 11 interfere so drastically with 
the Nollans' use of their property as to constitute a taking. 11 
Thus, for you, Justice Scalia's assumptions are purely hypotheti-
cal. ,_____._.. 
The above analysis is intended to show that Justice 
Scalia's opinion is not inconsistent with your point of view. 
The real problem is Justice Scalia's writing and reasoning style. ~ 
He enjoys taking hypothetical situations and spinning them out. 
Because the situations are hypothetical, and are based on assump-
tions rather than lower court findings, they do not result in 
holdings. There are two sides to the problem that results from 
this writing style issue. On the one hand, your difference with 
Justice Scalia is really not substantive, and so it would be un-
fortunate if you could not join his opinion. Given Justice Bren-
nan's 30-page dissent, lawyers who want to understand the Court's ,-~ 
position are already going to have a lc:>t of reading to do. A ~ 
page 5. 
separate concurrence only adds to the burden. On the other hand, 
that the problem is based on writing style makes it particularly 
difficult to sug ambiguities. 
The first full sentence o the most objectionable. But 
then the next two paragraphs build on the assumptions of that 
sentence. Again, the "shouting .fire in a crowded theater" hypo-
thetical is not inconsistent with your point of view: it is 
meant to illustrate that permit conditions must be related to 
their stated purpose. Nevertheless, because it is so hypotheti-
cal, it is not the clearest way to illustrate the holding of this 
case. 
In sum, you have F~t, you could join -
the opinion for the sake Court. In my view, this 
will not bind you to any position in the future with which you 
are likely to disagree. If read incorrectly, however, the opin-
ion could lead states like California to believe that they could 
prohibit building completely on beachfront property. Sec QDd, you -could join the opinion and write a short concurrence. This could 
clarify your view of the opinion. The problem with this route is 
that since your main objection to the opinion is its lack of 
clarity, a concurrence could appear to be merely a restatement of 
the Court opinion rather than a separate line of reasoning. 
__..... 
Third, you could join only the judgment and either write a sepa-
c:::::= 
rate concurrence or not. This has the virtue of disassociating 
you from the opinion. A separate concur renee could state that 
the assumptions made by the Court, even for the sake of argument, 
page 6. 
are highly questionable, and you see no need to make them as part 
of this opinion. 
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